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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PRIVATIZATION—THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY?

CAROL M. ROSE*

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, many governments around the world
have adopted measures that are often described as “privatization.” That label
generally refers to governmentally sponsored efforts to move assets and
economic decision-making away from the political arena and into the hands of
individuals or private corporations.1 Some of these efforts have been part of
the package of economic principles—the so-called “Washington Consensus”—
urged by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank since the early
1990s, and as such they have drawn criticism on a number of grounds.2
Influential proponents continue to advance privatization schemes over a great
range of subjects, both at home and abroad.3
Why have they done so? The primary reasons are economic. The old
Soviet Union and its satellites dramatically illustrated the manner in which
dirigiste, state-centered economies can lapse into wasteful decrepitude.4
* Ashby Lohse Professor of Water and Natural Resource Law, University of Arizona, Rogers
College of Law, and Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor of Law and Organization, Emerita, Yale
University. For very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article I wish to thank the
participants at the Yale Seminar in Latin America on Constitutional and Political Theory (SELA),
the Conference on Property, Citizenship and Social Entrepreneurship, and the University of
Arizona College of Law Faculty Enrichment Program. For very able research assistance I would
also like to thank Elizabeth Black, Pam Campos, and Hal Frampton.
1. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (8th ed. 2004).
2. See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, A World of Passions: How to Think About Globalization Now,
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., Summer 2004, at 1, 4 (describing the so-called “Washington
Consensus,” including deregulation and privatization of government-owned enterprises along
with trade liberalization). The origin of the name “Washington Consensus” is John Williamson,
What Washington Means By Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH
HAS HAPPENED? 5, 5 (John Williamson ed., 1990).
3. Eric Sylvers, Strong Demand as Italy Sells Utility Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at
W1 (describing privatization of Italian state energy utility and plans for privatization of state
telecommunications entity and postal service); cf. Ryan Tyz, Energy Maquiladoras: Integrating
the Electricity Markets of the United States and Mexico, 6 OR. REV. INT’L L. 63, 64–65 (2004)
(arguing that energy production has been slower to privatize, though the process is beginning).
4. See Roger Barrett James, Information—The Key to Fair Privatization: British Successes
and Russian Pitfalls, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 837, 851–57 (1998).
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Drawing a lesson from those bad examples, privatizers have hoped to infuse
their respective economic spheres with the efficiency, energy, and innovation
that are thought to accompany decentralized individual initiatives.
Nevertheless, over the last decade, critics have beaten the drums ever more
loudly about the failings and lapses of privatization policies, particularly as
represented by the Washington Consensus on international investment, and
they have thus lent some intellectual support to the leaders of popular backlash,
as well as to the political figures who wish to stage some kind of retreat.5
Many of these critiques point to the political costs of privatizations—their
adverse impact on local sovereignty,6 their short-changing of less-well-off
citizens,7 and their stirring of intergroup domestic strife.8
Privatization’s critics have encountered critics of their own,9 but they have
managed to shift some attention away from the economic foundations of
5. See, e.g., Juan Forero, Latin America Fails To Deliver on Basic Needs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
22, 2005, at A1 (describing popular resistance to privatizations); Larry Rohter, With New Chief,
Uruguay Veers Left, in a Latin Pattern, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2005, at A3 (describing newly
elected president’s promise to rein in privatization). A leading critic has been JOSEPH STIGLITZ,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 18, 57–58, 73–74, 247–48 (2002) (criticizing the pace
and insensitivity of Washington Consensus principles to specific needs, especially for poverty
reduction). Criticism also appears with respect to certain economic sectors. See, e.g., MAUDE
BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, BLUE GOLD: THE FIGHT TO STOP THE CORPORATE THEFT OF THE
WORLD’S WATER, at xii, 160–65 (2002) (criticizing Washington Consensus and international
financial institutions’ pressure to privatize water systems). Even American President George W.
Bush, a great proponent of private ownership of previously governmentally operated systems
such as retirement benefits, seems to notice the unpopularity of privatization. See Robin Toner,
It’s ‘Private’ vs. ‘Personal’ in Debate Over Bush Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at A16
(describing plan to privatize social security, though calling accounts “personal” instead of
“private”).
6. Catherine H. Lee, Comment, To Thine Own Self Be True: IMF Conditionality and
Erosion of Economic Sovereignty in the Asian Financial Crisis, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 875,
903–04 (2003) (arguing that world financial organizations’ imposition of Washington Consensus
infringes on national sovereignty); see also William Finnegan, The Economics of Empire: Notes
on the Washington Consensus, HARPER’S MAG., May 2003, at 50 (same); STIGLITZ, supra note 5,
at 247 (same).
7. See, e.g., Alhaji B.M. Marong, From Rio to Johannesburg: Reflections on the Role of
International Legal Norms in Sustainable Development, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 21, 33–34
(2003) (arguing that neoliberal Washington Consensus standards ignore distributional and
environmental welfare criteria).
8. AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS
ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 6–7 (2003) (arguing that privatization policies
ignore potential backlash against market-dominant minorities); see also Purdy, supra note 2, at
23–24 (arguing that Washington Consensus ignores emotional issues).
9. See, e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, A Review of Globalization and Its Discontents, 35 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 251, 254–56 (2003) (book review) (criticizing author Joseph Stiglitz for
inconsistencies in his critique of international lending policies); Tom Ginsburg, Democracy,
Markets and Doomsaying: Is Ethnic Conflict Inevitable?, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 310, 312
(2004) (reviewing AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY
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privatization, re-directing attention to the political aspects of privatization.
Following that lead, this Article will focus primarily on the political
intellectual rationales for privatization. Indeed, the arguments for privatization
have continually sounded a political note, though it may play a second or third
fiddle in the Washington Consensus:10 somewhere behind the economic case
for privatization is the companion idea that privatization promotes democracy.
Recent privatization efforts, taken together with increasing political
resistance to privatization, offer an opportunity to reassess this idea in the light
of recent experience. The Article will begin by setting out a fairly simplified
classification of some different types of measures that are commonly
considered “privatization.” Following that, the Article will delve into several
controversies surrounding such measures, and into the basic economic
arguments that are supposed to support privatization even in the face of
controversy. It will then shift the focus to the political rationales for
privatization.
Of particular interest is the light that modern privatization efforts cast on
the central political claim for privatization. That claim is that private property
and contract (as opposed to centrally organized economic direction)
fundamentally advance the growth of democratic institutions.11 A variety of
arguments purport to support this central claim—arguments that long predate
modern privatization efforts and that have been remarkably persistent over
time. At least some aspects of modern privatization do indeed add to their
weight. Nevertheless, there are also weighty exceptions, suggesting that
privatization alone cannot do all the work of democratization. While in some
respects, modern privatization initiatives indicate that individual economic
rights—together with the larger economies that grow out of them—sometimes
do help to foster accountable institutions, in other respects it is clear that these
initiatives toward private ownership depend on a pre-existing accountable
institutional infrastructure. The basic argument of this Article is thus that the
relationship of privatization and democratic governance cannot be seen simply
as ancestor-to-successor, where the one (privatization) precedes the other
(democratization). At most (to continue the family analogy) privatization and
democratization are siblings, co-existing in a mixed environment of mutual
support, dependence, and occasional rivalry.
II. A TYPOLOGY OF PRIVATIZATIONS

BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003), arguing that evidence does not
support its thesis of link between privatization and ethnic conflict).
10. See Williamson, supra note 2, at 8 (describing “promotion of democracy and human
rights” as a concern, but one far behind economic motivations in the Washington Consensus).
11. Carol M. Rose, Property As the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 333–34
(1996) [hereinafter Keystone Right].
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Very roughly, one can classify the last two decades’ privatization
initiatives into four types of state-sponsored measures with respect to property,
which I will call “recognition,” “deregulation,” “divestment,” and
“enablement.”
First, recognition measures are those that provide the administrative means
to regularize private property ownership, particularly by formalizing ownership
rights in persons who previously enjoyed only informal claims. This is a fairly
low-key form of privatization, though it too can be controversial. One major
type of recognition measure is the reform of titling procedures. This reform
seems quite pedestrian at first glance, but it can have large implications for
security of title, and security of title in turn can have large implications for the
lives of property owners.12 The Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto in
particular has brought these titling reform measures into the public eye,
arguing that developing countries can very much enhance their wealth by
converting informal land titles—claims held in squatter communities in
particular—into formal ones.13 De Soto stresses that with formal title to their
property, newly secured owners can use their property as collateral to borrow
money and finance small businesses.14 Other scholars point out that with
formal title, an owner can enforce her claims through the police, the courts,
and other governmental institutions, and as a consequence she need not spend
so much effort on guarding her property in person, nor need she rely so heavily
on neighborhood bosses to enforce her claims.15 Once freed from those
burdens, she might be able to take a job at some distance from her home,
knowing that her property is safe from a forceful takeover by others.16 Finally,
clearer titles simply loosen up the market for property, allowing resources to
flow into the hands of those who are willing to pay most for them. For these
reasons and others, Peru, India, and Thailand, among a number of other
countries, are currently making major efforts to simplify the registration of
land titles.17

12. See KLAUS DEININGER, LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION 36–
50 (2003), http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=477769&pagePK=641680
92&piPK=64168088&theSitePK=477757 (World Bank report describing importance of land
security, including titling).
13. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).
14. See id. at 51, 57–58.
15. See Erica Field, Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru 35–
36 (Oct. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=347240).
16. See, e.g., id.
17. See Joanna Slater, India’s Land Market Impedes Growth, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2002, at
B7C (concerning land registration reforms in India and other Asian countries); Field, supra note
15.
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Second is deregulation, that is, relaxing governmental control over
entrepreneurial activities. India, again, is considering abandoning its elaborate
constraints on the size of individual landholdings;18 meanwhile Germany
debates the welter of labor regulations that may protect currently employed
workers but that may also impede businesses’ ability to create new jobs.19 The
general idea of deregulation is to shed governmental intrusions that simply
protect certain groups at the expense of others, or that pursue ideological goals
that no longer seem useful. On those grounds, many countries carry
regulations that would seem to be candidates. Just to take the example of size
limits on landholding: India is by no means alone in these regulations. In order
to protect small farmers, the United States until recently imposed sharp
restrictions on the size of farms that received irrigation water from federally
financed dams, but large-scale agricultural interests evaded these limits by
entering into complicated leasing arrangements.20 In the end, the constraints
seemed to do no one any good because they were so widely evaded, and
because they complicated market transactions for no good reason.21 A
different kind of protectionist regulation is residential rent control, which can
keep current tenants’ rents low, but which may make it difficult for outsiders to
find a place to rent, since owners may balk at opening up more property at
fixed rents.22
Favoritism and inefficiency are nothing new in regulatory regimes, of
course; Adam Smith complained about these issues over two hundred years
ago.23 Nevertheless, most commentators acknowledge that certain types of
regulatory controls may be necessary to safeguard public health and safety,
along with the environment, matters that are often underprotected by the
market transactions of private owners.24 The trick, of course, is to figure out

18. Slater, supra note 17.
19. Carter Dougherty, Jobless Germans Face a New Round of Benefit Cuts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 2004, at W1 (describing cuts in formerly ample benefits).
20. See Hamilton Candee, The Broken Promise of Reclamation Reform, 40 HASTINGS L.J.
657, 660–63 (1989) (describing 1902 legislation restricting reclamation water delivery to 160acre farms and widespread evasion through leasing). The Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1263 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa–390zz-1), expanded the size limit
for subsidized water to 960 acres, with owners being required to pay full price for larger acreage.
Id. at 664–65.
21. See id. at 661.
22. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 741, 762–63, 767 (1988) (describing issues created by rent control statutes); cf.
Peter D. Salins, Reflections on Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L.
REV. 775 (1988) (noting that Epstein’s arguments to date have been impossible to test).
23. EMMA ROTHSCHILD, ECONOMIC SENTIMENTS 127–28 (2001) (describing Smith’s low
opinion of merchants’ propensity to seek and get political favors).
24. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1998) (noting that theories of regulation derive from
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which regulations are genuinely socially advantageous to overcome market
failures, and which are merely protectionist or ideological. For example, a few
years ago the United States banned tuna fish imports when the fish had been
caught without excluding dolphins from the nets.25 The United States claimed
that this measure was an environmental protection.26 But Mexico brought a
complaint under international trade agreements, claiming that these purported
dolphin protections were merely protectionist measures to shield U.S.
fishermen from Mexican competition.27 Mexico’s success in this claim did not
close the issue, however, since many still believe that the tuna regulation was
an important environmental measure and not merely an example of
protectionism.28
A third privatization initiative I will call divestiture, i.e., removing whole
enterprises from governmental administration and placing them instead in the
hands of private entrepreneurs. These are probably the best-known kinds of
“privatization” measures, and they can be very controversial. Margaret
Thatcher’s government in England led the way in the 1980’s, denationalizing
all kinds of industries that had been brought into public ownership over the
course of the twentieth century, particularly under Labour governments after
the Second World War.29 A decade later, with the collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1989, Russia and Eastern Europe saw whole arrays of enterprises moving
into private hands.30 Beginning at about the same time, at the urging of
international financial institutions, a number of Latin American countries
experimented with the privatization of several different industries, for example
market failure). Croley, however, faults the major theories of regulation for failing to account for
the actual regulatory process. Id. at 3–6.
25. Richard Skeen, Will the WTO Turn Green? Implications of Injecting Environmental
Issues into the Multilateral Trading System, 17 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 161, 185–86 (2004).
26. Id. at 187.
27. For a brief account, see id. at 186–88 (describing the case, its outcome, and a follow-up
case involving the Netherlands).
28. See Belina Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental Protection Policy,
66 TEMP. L. REV. 751, 751–52, 783 (1993) (noting that some environmentalist groups were
sufficiently alarmed to ask for reconsideration of trade agreements; Mexico and the United States
defused political heat by making a subsequent agreement for dolphin protections).
29. For an extensive study of the theory and practice of the Thatcher-era deregulations, see
JOHN VICKERS & GEORGE YARROW, PRIVATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1988); see also
id. at 139–40, 160–69 (for postwar era of nationalization and the radical shift to privatization after
1979); James, supra note 4, at 837, 842–51 (narrating a short history of British privatization).
James, supra note 4, at 837, 842–51.
30. See, e.g., James, supra note 4 at 857–69 (describing massive Russian privatizations in
the early 1990s); John White, Privatization in Eastern and Central Europe, 13 INT’L L.
PRACTICUM 19, 22–25 (2000) (giving a survey of privatizations in Poland, the Czech Republic,
and Hungary); TERRY COX & BOB MASON, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN EAST
CENTRAL EUROPE 101–04 (1999) (summarizing post-Soviet era economic restructuring in the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland).
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telecommunications systems and municipal waterworks.31 Even China now
has been quietly pondering measures that move agriculture at least partly out
of state or commune control and into the hands of peasants.32
Enablement refers to the governmental establishment and protection of
property rights in resources that would otherwise not easily be turned into
property at all. Intellectual property rights—trademark, copyright, and
patent—are a well-established example of governmentally enabled property
rights. These property rights owe their existence very largely to statutory law.
They effectively privatize the uses of inventions and expressions that would
otherwise be open to copying by the general public. Intellectual property (IP)
is not new; the protection of copyright in the English speaking world is
commonly dated back to the Statute of Anne in 1710, and patent rights for
inventors followed over the next century.33 In recent decades, however, IP has
become particularly important, as global trade has whetted interest in the
import and export of expressive materials and technology all over the world,
and as new technologies have made it so much easier to copy the ideas of
others.34 Indeed, IP in a sense signals how closely privatization is linked to
globalization. Questions about IP have become a major focus in debates over
world trade, with more developed countries usually pressing for greater IP
protection while less developed countries hold out for more relaxed rules.35

31. See Andrea L. Johnson, Preserving Privatization of Telecommunications in Five
Emerging Markets: Germany, Egypt, South Korea, Argentina and Mexico, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 311 (2002) (concerning telecommunications in Latin American countries, among others);
Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Tracy Higgins, No Recourse: Transnational Corporations
and the Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Bolivia, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1663, 1747–74 (2004) (describing “water wars” in Bolivia following privatization of water
system in Cochabamba); Erik J. Woodhouse, Comment, The “Guerra del Agua” and the
Cochabamba Concession: Social Risk and Foreign Direct Investment in Public Infrastructure, 39
STAN. J. INT’L L. 295 (2003).
32. Joseph Kahn, China Pledges to Lift Wealth of Its Peasants, INT’L HERALD TRIB. Feb. 3,
2005, at 1 (describing debates over the possibility of increasing peasant land rights).
33. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 43 (1994) (describing the legislative background of the Statute of Anne); Adam
Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History 1550–1800, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1259–64 (2001) (tracing history of British “patent” from royal grant of
monopoly to protection for inventors).
34. See, e.g., Susan Teifenbrun, Piracy of Intellectual Property in China and the Former
Soviet Union and Its Effect upon International Trade: A Comparison, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3–4
(1998) (arguing that the failure of governments like China and the former Soviet Union to control
intellectual piracy has cost the United States between $20 and $40 billion in revenue).
35. See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry and World Intellectual Property
Standards, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2248–50 (2000) (describing a campaign by drug companies
to get stronger international IP protections for a variety of western products and resistance from
less-developed countries).
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Although this Article will focus on IP as the primary example of
privatization through governmental enablement, there are other property rights
that have also depended almost wholly on governmental action. Tradeable
environmental allowances (TEAs) are another example. Although TEAs are
newer, less well-developed, and more experimental than IP rights, they are
certainly much-discussed as a means to control pollution and resource
depletion.36 Among the better-known TEA regimes are the United States’
program for tradeable emission rights in the gases that form acid rain and the
European Union’s more recent proposals to use tradeable rights to control
carbon dioxide emissions.37 These too are property rights that owe their
existence to enabling governmental legislation, generally passed quite overtly
to promote ends that would otherwise be served by more direct command
regulation.
III. CONTROVERSY, ECONOMY, POLITICS
All of the above types of privatization have proved to be controversial and
disruptive in some locations and circumstances. Converting informal titles to
formal ones, for example, can encourage squatters to try to displace existing
private owners, leading to the kinds of conflicts that sometimes break out in
rural Brazil.38 In the more common case, where squatters settle on public lands
rather than private ones, the relevant public spaces may be environmentally
sensitive or dangerous to the squatters themselves, for example areas subject to
flooding or mudslides.39 Deregulation of the workplace can disrupt existing
labor relations, just as housing deregulation can upend landlord–tenant
relations; meanwhile, the loosening of environmental regulations can leave the
air, water, and flora and fauna unprotected and vulnerable to degradation.
Divestiture of formerly state-run enterprises threatens the jobs of employees in
formerly governmentally operated enterprises, and it alarms consumers about
the private takeover of what seem to be governmental functions.40 Enablement

36. See, e.g., Thomas Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275,
276 (2000) (describing literature on market and trade-based environmental programs); Carol M.
Rose, Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled Tradable
Allowance Schemes to Old-Fashioned Common Property Regimes, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 45, 51–56 (1999).
37. Rose, supra note 36, at 54–55.
38. See Kristen Mitchell, Market-Assisted Land Reform in Brazil: A New Approach to
Address an Old Problem, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 557, 570–71 (2003) (describing
legitimization of squatting and the resulting increase in squatting and violence).
39. Winter King, Illegal Settlements and the Impact of Titling Programs, 44 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 433, 441 (2003).
40. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Market Place: Two Companies Hope Going Public Will Solve
Their Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at C9 (describing union resistance to privatization of
state-owned French electric service).
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laws, through which governments create property rights in otherwise unowned
resources, raise moral issues about the extent to which private individuals
should be able to own nature or ideas and profit from them—particularly when,
as in the case of pharmaceutical products, the protection of “enabled” property
rights seems to come at the cost of sick persons’ health.41
Given the controversial nature of these various forms of privatization, it is
important to ask about their purposes. What are governments attempting to
accomplish through privatization? Why is private decision-making, made by
property owners, thought to be preferable to governmental management, where
decisions are made by public servants?
The chief answer to these questions, of course, is an economic one.
During the Cold War, many thought that central planning would prove to be
economically superior to private property and free contract—that is to say,
capitalism. “We will bury you,” Nikita Khrushchev notoriously warned the
West.42 But in the end, it was central planning that was buried, unable to
compete with the variety, innovation, and nimbleness of market forces.43
Economic thinkers have long had an explanation: private property creates
the right incentives for creating value.44 The owner gets the rewards if she
plans carefully, works hard, and pays attention to useful innovation; and she
takes the punishment if things do not work well because of her carelessness
and laziness. Those rewards and punishments are powerful motivations to
industry, initiative, and attentive planning. Moreover, property rights identify
who has what, and thus they encourage people to negotiate trades instead of
wasting time on quarrelling and jockeying for position. In turn, the ability to
buy and sell greatly enhances the value of everyone’s property. Free
alienability means that an individual owner can specialize in, say, shoemaking,
because she can buy her foodstuffs from others who are specializing in raising
food. Since the shoemaker can now sell her shoes to a whole array of people
who want them, her shoemaking talent and tools become all the more valuable.
The same can be said of the farmer who can specialize in raising particular
crops.
These crude examples carry through to the enormously sophisticated
creations of a modern economy. Take for example intellectual property, a

41. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Death by Dividend, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2003,
at A15 (attributing AIDS deaths to the United States’ insistence on patent protection).
42. In an interesting later development, Khrushchev’s son Sergei took American citizenship
and used the occasion to explain that his father only meant the famous phrase in an economic
sense. Francis X. Clines, A Khrushchev Is Pledging New Allegiance, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1999,
at A1.
43. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet is Changing International Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 997, 1035 (1998) (“The West won the Cold War not by military success but by ideas.”).
44. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 110 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931), for
the classic statement of this principle.
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highly complex form of property: Although some commentators disagree,45
one major theory of intellectual property is squarely based on the same kind of
rationale: that is, when we allocate property rights to the person who creates
expressions or inventions, he or she is encouraged to produce all the more
expressive works and inventiveness.46 Conversely, on this theory, treating
inventions and expressions as free for the taking would much diminish the
artist’s or inventor’s willingness to put time and thought into these products. If
for some reason they did create anyway, they would hoard their secrets rather
than disseminating them through trade. Thus whether the issue is building a
fence around the family farm or going through the steps to get a biotech patent,
property rights taken together with freedom of contract—the basic building
blocks of free enterprise—are thought to make everyone better off, because
they encourage labor and innovation, permit specialization, and encourage the
free movement of goods and services to those persons who most value them.
These are old arguments, going back to the eighteenth century and
before.47 It is of course also widely known that capitalism is subject to what
are called “market failures,” where property and contract require some
constraints.48 But even given that caveat, the basic lesson of these arguments
has much influenced today’s thinking about economic development, including
the push for privatization made by international trade and finance institutions.49
But those are not the only arguments for privatization. Quite aside from
these well-known economic arguments, there are additional political
arguments for private property—arguments that are also long-standing, and
that were developed more or less contemporaneously with the classical
Enlightenment case for private property as an economic matter. Putting it
succinctly, the classical political brief for property stated that private property
supports democracy and liberty. As one eighteenth century American
Revolutionary leader put it, “[P]roperty is the guardian of every other right.”50
45. See Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Social Progress: The Case
Against Incentive Based Arguments, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 601, 603 (2003).
46. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (describing theory of patents and
copyrights as the encouragement of individual inventiveness).
47. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, ‘Enough, and as Good’ of What?, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 417, 419–
30 (1987) (describing views of John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, and Adam Smith on the social
utility of property and trade).
48. See, e.g., Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV.
317, 354 (explaining that “market failures,” or situations where the market fails to meet
expectations, are a requisite condition for unconscionable contracts).
49. See, e.g., W. Graeme Donovan, Investing in Rural Development, in AGRICULTURAL
INTENSIFICATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 47, 56 (Steven A. Breth ed., 1998).
50. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 (2d ed. 1998) (quoting ARTHUR LEE, AN APPEAL TO THE
JUSTICE AND INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN, IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE WITH
AMERICA 14 (4th ed. 1775)).
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That is to say, not only is property ownership an important political right, but it
is the most important of all.
This assertion may seem strange in a modern context, where so many
people would be likely to select free speech as the critical political right, the
one right that guards all others.51 But if one listens more closely, one hears
many echoes of this thought about property even now, at the beginning of the
twenty-first century, and indeed those echoes may be getting louder.52 This is
a subject on which I have written in the past,53 but the modern controversies
over privatization present an opportunity to revisit some of the classic political
arguments that property (along with contract) are the central rights, the critical
core, of what we would broadly see as democratic liberty, such that the
establishment of property and trade form the ground floor for the development
and flourishing of democratic institutions. How do these classic arguments
map onto the modern contours of privatization?
IV. PRIVATIZATION AND THE CASE FOR PROPERTY’S POLITICAL CENTRALITY
The privatization efforts of the past decades certainly seem to focus on
converting public management to private property. How do these efforts
reflect on the array of political arguments about property’s centrality to liberty
and democracy? In the pages that follow, I will go through some of the
arguments for property’s centrality, to look for the light that the new
privatization casts on these arguments.
A.

The Priority Argument: Property Is the Central Right Because Property
Alone Predates, and Justifies, Government

Here the classic treatment is John Locke’s, who famously argued that
individuals acquired property before governments were formed, and that when
they eventually formed governments, they did so in order to secure their
property.54 Governmental intrusions on property, in this view, undermine the
very purposes for which government is formed.55 Thus human propertyformation not only predates government but gives people the normative
leverage to critique government: government is only legitimate if it protects
people’s property.
51. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (“The safeguarding of these
rights to the ends that men may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods
may be exposed through the processes of education and discussion is essential to free
government.”).
52. See, e.g., O. Lee Reed, What is Property?, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 476–77 (2004)
(arguing that constitutional rights emanate from property rights).
53. See Keystone Right, supra note 11.
54. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 315–17 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
55. Id. at 378.
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A more modern development of this line of argument comes from a very
interesting school of political scientists who have specialized in the study of
small-scale common property regimes. A leader in this group is Professor
Elinor Ostrom of Indiana University, who has described and analyzed
communities all over the world, communities in which local people have
created institutions for managing irrigation systems, fisheries, grazing fields,
and other activities undertaken in common.56 Ostrom and her colleagues argue
that many of these self-created common property regimes have sprung up and
lasted for long periods of time—some for centuries on end—without
governmental support.57 Indeed, she argues that all too often governments
unjustly and unwisely disrupt these community institutions, as for example
when corrupt or thoughtless bureaucrats in a central government allow their
friends to invade a community’s distribution of fishing rights among the local
residents.58 The lesson from Locke to Ostrom seems to be that people can
form property regimes without government; that government’s role, if any, is
to assist in property formation; and that overly intrusive governments
effectively undermine the natural and sustainable economic activity of human
beings. Following Ostrom, what some scholars would like to see would be
governmental protection of the fishery—or the grazing area or irrigation
system—as a common property resource for the relevant community;
privatization in that sense would be entirely appropriate.59
At least one of the new privatization categories, however, casts a
somewhat different light on this set of arguments about the relationship of
property to government. That is the “recognition” category, notably the efforts
to clarify, simplify, and formalize previously informal or unclear titles. Formal
title is not important in the genre of older communities that Ostrom and her
colleagues have generally studied, because everyone in the community
understands the informal distribution of entitlements.60 For example, in one
Swiss village, the most important property right consists of access to the

56. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 61–65 (1990) (describing the communal tenure system
that has developed in a centuries-old Swiss village).
57. Id. at 58.
58. See, e.g., id. at 154–57 (explaining how central governmental intrusion into fishery
weakens local self-management of fishery); Evelyn Pinkerton, Intercepting the State: Dramatic
Processes in the Assertion of Local Comanagement Rights, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS
344, 358–63 (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987) (citing examples of central
governmental policies that encouraged local overfishing).
59. See, e.g., Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship and
the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 405–06 (1999).
60. See OSTROM, supra note 56, at 88–91 (describing normative behavior that has developed
in ancient communities to control use and transfer of property).
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meadows where a resident can graze his livestock.61 But such grazing access
rights belong only to village citizens, and only members of very longstanding
resident families can be citizens.62 These are communities that my colleague
Robert Ellickson describes as “close-knit”:63 the residents all know one
another, and they are intimately aware of who has what property claims.64 If
there are transfers of property, everyone knows about that, too. These transfers
can be made without written documents and formal recording, and the gestures
of transfer may be witnessed and understood only by local people—the
handshake, the transfer of a clod of dirt or a set of keys.65 More modern
squatter communities too depend on enforcement of their informal claims
through barrio insiders, e.g., the community “bosses” in Ecuador who accept
payment for protecting residents’ informal claims.66
By contrast, the clarification of formal title is useful precisely because it
makes the status of property knowable to outsiders, that is, to strangers to the
community. Formal title, managed through central record offices, makes it
possible for the owner to borrow from a bank on the security of the property.
A lending bank also formally records its own secured interest, and this means
that if the borrower fails to repay, the lending bank—perhaps in some distant
city—may become the title owner of the property. Indeed, formal title gives
assurances to any stranger at all who may want to purchase the property. Thus
formal title potentially introduces strangers into the community, through a
form of property assurance that is not at all “natural” to a close-knit
community.
Formal title, in short, is an assurance of property that does not predate the
state. Formal title is a creature of the state, and if anything it tends to dissolve
the small-scale communities in which property can be created by “nature.” As
an economic matter, formal property rights are effectively available to a global
economy, not simply to a local one; thus formal title opens up these small
communities to a whole world of potential buyers. This opening-up process
may or may not happen, and local residents may or may not see it as a good
thing. But as a political matter, this particular “recognizing” mode of

61. See ROBERT MCC. NETTING, BALANCING ON AN ALP: ECOLOGICAL CHANGE AND
CONTINUITY IN A SWISS MOUNTAIN VILLAGE 78 (1981).
62. Id.
63. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
177–78 (1991).
64. Id.
65. See Bernard J. Hibbitts, “Coming to Our Senses”: Communication and Legal Expression
in Performance Cultures, 41 EMORY L.J. 873, 911–19 (1992) (describing the variety of gestures
in different cultures signifying contractual obligation, including land transfer).
66. Jean O. Lanjouw & Phillip Levy, Untitled: A Study of Formal and Informal Property
Rights in Urban Ecuador, 112 ECON. J. 986, 992–93 (2002).
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privatization can scarcely be justified on the classic ground that it simply
reinforces a form of pre-existing property that is somehow natural to humans.
Formal title, and the economic benefits it brings, introduces property rights
that potentially engage much wider populations than any that exist in a
Lockean (or Ostromian) state of nature. Property rights of this sort, rights that
hold between strangers, cannot easily exist without the political organization of
state agencies.67 Thus “privatization” of this sort assumes the active
participation of government.68 That fact alone sharply detracts from the easy
assumption that privatization supports democratic government because
privatization protects “natural” pre-existing property rights. This is not the
case. Formal title, like IP rights, gives rise to a form of property that would not
exist at all without governments.69 Whatever relationship this kind of
privatization may have to democratic governance—and it could be a strong
one—it is distinctly not about governmental recognition of some kind of
natural property right. Quite the contrary, the property protected by formal
title tends to erode the kinds of “natural,” community-based property rights
that can predate government.
Parenthetically, recognition programs are among the most attractive forms
of privatization; formal titling concentrates on furthering the economic
advancement of people who otherwise have very limited prospects.70 But
because formal titling programs potentially open a community to strangers,
they give a frisson of the kinds of larger-scale problems generally associated
with the term “anti-globalization.” When outsiders can freely enter a local
economy, they may bring needed capital, but only at a cost: the loss of a sense
of local or national control.71 This is of course one of the reasons why
globalization can be so very disturbing to some local populations.72 Just as
formal title puts a barrio house into play in an economy that is much larger

67. See Jean O. Lanjouw & Philip Levy, A Difficult Question in Deed: A Cost-Benefit
Framework for Titling Programs, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 889, 896–97 (2004) (providing
general description of formal titling programs and stating that “[registration with the state] helps
avoid overlapping claims and when done well can give confidence to potential buyers or lenders
as to who actually owns a piece of land”).
68. See generally id.
69. See, e.g., J. David Stanfield & Steven E. Hendrix, Ownership Insecurity in Nicaragua,
22 CAP. U. L. REV. 939, 941 (1993) (asserting that the “insecurity in negotiated transfers” in
Nicaragua is due in part to poor state-run title registries).
70. Cf. Pooja Mehta, Comment, Internally Displaced Persons and the Sardar Sarovar
Project: A Case for Rehabilitative Reform in Rural India, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 613, 638
(2005) (noting that holding formal title is a means for Indian tribal populations to gain access to
remedies allowed under Indian law).
71. See, e.g., Nsongura J. Udombana, How Should We Then Live? Globalization and the
New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 20 B.U. INT’L L.J. 293, 301 (2002) (describing the
argument that globalization has had a debilitating effect on African political systems).
72. See id.
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than the local community, so do other forms of privatization put a country’s
natural resources or banks or telecommunications systems at play in an even
larger international economy. At times, this can be a deeply unpopular feature
of privatization, and even a ground for civic unrest that shakes democratic
institutions.73
B.

The Power-Spreading Argument: Property is a Central Right Because It
Diffuses Political Power

Perhaps the best-known proponent of this view is Milton Friedman, a
libertarian economist who began to espouse his views in the 1950s and
1960s.74 Friedman very much opposed socialism on political grounds as well
as economic ones, arguing that socialist states had only a single source of
power.75 Because the socialist state could control jobs, education, and indeed
advancement on any front, Friedman argued, the socialist state could repress
dissent easily.76 Capitalism and private property, on the other hand, offer
multiple sources of power, taking the forms of income, prestige, and assets.77
Thus on Friedman’s argument, states that permit private property and free
enterprise also foster the proliferation of multiple power sources and,
ultimately, diverse political views and movements.78
Interestingly enough, there is an older version of this argument that
appeared during the eighteenth century Enlightenment, when the political
figures most interested in “privatization” were actually the so-called
“enlightened despots,” figures like Frederick II of Prussia, Catherine the Great
of Russia, and Joseph II of Austria.79 These monarchs hoped to foster
commerce for both economic and political reasons: economic, in that they
hoped that commerce would bring more wealth and thus tax revenue to their
treasuries; and political, in that they hoped that the “deregulation” of
aristocratic and guild monopoly privileges would undermine some of their
most entrenched opponents.80 Then, as now, deregulation caused anxiety and
fierce opposition among the holders of the numerous exclusive privileges.81
73. See, e.g., COX & MASON, supra note 30, at 79 (describing popular objection to loss of
control from privatization and foreign investment in early post-Communist Eastern Europe); Juan
Forero, Free Trade Proposal Splits Bolivian City, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005, at C1 (describing
protests, violence, and instability over planned trading agreement with United States to export
Bolivian natural gas).
74. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
75. Id. at 15–16.
76. Id. at 16–17.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 9–10.
79. See JOHN G. GAGLIARDO, ENLIGHTENED DESPOTISM 21–22 (1967).
80. See id. at 28–36 (describing the economic policies of the “enlightened monarchs” of
Europe).
81. FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at 43–44.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

706

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:691

Town guilds in Germany, for example, very much opposed royal charters for
manufacturers to open factories in the countryside outside the guilds’ legal
But James Steuart, a writer associated with the Scottish
control.82
Enlightenment, asserted that even though monarchs were chiefly concerned
with enlarging their tax revenues when they undermined the older privileged
classes and fostered free commerce, in taking such measures they would
engender a new class of wealthy entrepreneurs, and these newcomers would
demand greater liberty and limitations on arbitrary rule.83 Hence, economic
liberalization would bring about political reform—whether monarchs liked it
or not.
How does the power-spreading argument map onto modern privatization
measures? Clearly this argument does have some resonance, particularly with
respect to the divestiture of state enterprises in favor of private control.
Consider China: as China increasingly shifts formerly state-run operations to
private enterprise, Western democracies continue to echo the hope that Steuart
expressed over 200 years ago: that freer markets make citizens more rightsconscious and ultimately force rulers to open up more breathing room to
democratic processes.84 Indeed, in some measure, this has happened. The
Chinese press is not bold by Western standards, but it still is bolder than it was
a few years ago, and as property has spread among the citizens, small-scale

82. See MACK WALKER, GERMAN HOME TOWNS: COMMUNITY, STATE, AND GENERAL
ESTATE 1648–1871, at 120–22, 125–26 (1971) (describing guild conflicts with non-guild large
merchants, arguing that royal officials favored the latter).
83. 1 SIR JAMES STEUART, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OECONOMY
216 (Andrew S. Skinner ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1966) (1767).
84. See, e.g., Press Release, White House, President Nominates Rob Portman as United
States Trade Representative (Mar. 17, 2005), available at 2005 WLNR 4151089 (describing
Portman as a negotiator of the free trade agreement with China and Portman’s belief that
“[t]hrough expanded trade, the roots of democracy and freedom are deepened”). For a more
systematic presentation, see Pitman B. Potter, Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and
Selective Adaptation, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 467–68, 480–81 (2004) (describing the view
of author Randall Peerenboom that Chinese economic development makes citizens demand more
rights and describing economic development as generating alternative power sources); Erich
Weede, The Diffusion of Prosperity and Peace by Globalization, 9 INDEP. REV. 165 (2004)
(developing the theme that prosperity promotes democracy, and both lead to peace, using China
as an example of a country where greater prosperity brings about more attention to rights and
ultimately less bellicosity); Anthony Kuhn, China’s Newly Rich are Getting Political, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 17, 2004, at A14 (describing increasing political activity of new Chinese entrepreneurs);
see also STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 163–64 (attributing to Andrei Shleifer, and sharply criticizing,
the view that privatization would lead to a demand for political institutions to reform economy);
cf. Ellen Bork, Asian Blues: Why the Problem of China Will Not Go Away, WKLY. STANDARD,
July 19, 2004, at 34 (criticizing what the author describes as the decades-long “driving idea” that
democracy in China will follow from economic engagement).
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grassroots protests have emerged in a way unthinkable only a decade ago.85
As yet, of course, this is a transformation still in the making, and China
certainly is not yet a case study for the diffusion of political power in the wake
of marketization.
In addition, other modern “divestitures” give some reason for caution. The
experience of the former Soviet Union suggests that the divestiture of former
state-run enterprises may diffuse power, but that this diffusion might not
spread very far. Major economic sectors like energy and banking soon became
concentrated into the hands of a favored few.86 Indeed, the popular backlash
against the Yeltsin-era “oligarchs” appears to have strengthened the hands of
President Putin in re-centralizing governmental control over the press and the
electoral machinery.87
One type of privatization-by-divestiture may present particular problems as
a route to the diffusion of political power: the divestiture and transfer of some
former public utilities, enterprises that have been called “natural
monopolies.”88 These types of enterprises generally have infrastructure or
other startup costs that are so high that there effectively is only room for one
participant. For example, once the electric lines are up, there may not be
enough demand for electricity to support a second set of lines. This
discrepancy gives the first mover a great advantage. If threatened with
competition, the first mover can lower rates to marginal cost until the rival is

85. See BRUCE GILLEY, CHINA’S DEMOCRATIC FUTURE 72–74 (2004) (describing Chinese
press’s greater boldness); Jonathan Kaufman, New Crop of Protesters in Tiananmen Square:
Restive Homeowners, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2004, at A1 (describing new homeowners’
organization and protests).
86. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Anna S. Tarassova, Institutional Reform in Transition: A
Case Study of Russia, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 211, 218–20 (2003) (describing the acquisition by
“oligarchs” of major economic sectors, including natural resources, which resulted in
undermining support for democratic and economic reforms). See generally DAVID E. HOFFMAN,
THE OLIGARCHS: WEALTH AND POWER IN THE NEW RUSSIA (2002) (providing biographical
information, including a description of the rise of “oligarchs”). Interestingly enough, the
divestitures of British nationalized enterprises in the 1980s showed some of the same “giveaway”
characteristics. See VICKERS & YARROW, supra note 29, at 180–81, 183–85 (describing sharply
uneven payoffs from the sale of enterprises); see also COX & MASON, supra note 30, at 131–33,
201 (describing a greater gap between the rich and poor in poverty in post-Soviet era Eastern
Europe, along with the potential for social unrest).
87. Book Notes, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 179, 188 (2004) (describing Putin’s suppression of the
“oligarchs”); Stefan Wagstyl & Arkady Ostrovsky, Power to Putin: But is Russia’s Leader Too
Authoritarian for His Own Good?, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 17, 2004, at 17 (describing
Russian populace as “revel[ing]” in Putin’s prosecution of oligarchs).
88. See Henry Carter Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action, in 1 PUBLICATIONS
AM. ECON. ASS’N., 465 (1887), reprinted in TWO ESSAYS BY HENRY CARTER ADAMS 59, 80
(Joseph Dorfman ed., 1969) (explaining the theory of “natural monopoly”); see also WILLIAM W.
SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 12–20 (1982) (describing the history of
economic thinking about natural monopoly).
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driven out of business. These “natural monopolies” typically exist in power
delivery, transportation facilities, water and sewer lines, and to some (now
diminishing) degree, telecommunications.89 Nineteenth century economic
theory treated as a matter of indifference whether such “natural monopolies”
were state-run (as with the German railroads), or privately run (as with the
U.S. railroads), so long as the latter operated under state regulatory supervision
to avoid monopolistic prices and practices.90 In an interesting example, for
well over a century, New York City shifted its water supply system back and
forth between private and public ownership, beginning with a private company
in the late 1700s, then shifting to public control in the 1830s, then trying a
private firm again in the early twentieth century, before putting the system
firmly in the city’s hands thereafter.91
In emerging economies, both private and public management often have
difficulty raising the capital needed for major improvements in these major
public works. Thus as was the case with New York City’s water supply,
public officials may transfer control to private management in the hope that a
private enterprise can raise more initial capital. They may hope as well that
private management will be more efficient and innovative than bureaucracy,
and that private managers can more easily charge consumers to cover the costs
of modernizing infrastructure. In some cases, some or all of these hopes for
improvement can be realized, particularly since public management of utilities
can grow slack—bureaucratized, rudderless, ridden with political meddling,
and generally underperforming.92
But private management has problems too—notably, that a “natural
monopoly” in private hands, unless adequately monitored and regulated, is in
principle constrained neither by political accountability nor by economic
competition.93 It is this apparent gap in control that sometimes makes public
utilities problematic as candidates for divestiture, not only because of the
economic effects of privatization, but also because of the political
89. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: An
American Historical Perspective, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1263, 1273–75 (1984) (describing the
characteristics and various types of natural monopoly); cf. Wei Li & Lixin Colin Xu, The Impact
of Privatization and Competition in the Telecommunications Sector Around the World, 47 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 400 (2004) (arguing that technological advances have reduced the natural monopoly
characteristics of telecommunications).
90. See Adams, supra note 88, at 71, 111.
91. GERARD T. KOEPPEL, WATER FOR GOTHAM: A HISTORY 68, 140–41, 165, 289 (2000).
92. See, e.g., VICKERS & YARROW, supra note 29, at 130–34, 143–50 (describing
weaknesses of British nationalized enterprises).
93. See STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 56 (criticizing the privatization of utilities prior to the
development of effective regulatory structures); VICKERS & YARROW, supra note 29, at 428–29
(concluding that British divestiture was short-sighted in the case of some aspects of utilities and
describing other enterprises with natural monopoly characteristics); Li & Xu, supra note 89, at
400 (noting the importance of competition in successful privatization).
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consequences. In particular, privatization of public utilities in some instances
defies the political argument that private control diffuses power. Instead of
spreading power outward, these privatizations of “natural monopolies” would
appear to place great power in private hands (and indeed, sometimes, foreign
hands) that is unconstrained either by private competition or by public
oversight. Citizen outrage at this kind of apparent aggrandizement can be
tremendously disruptive politically, as in the electricity crisis in California a
few years ago,94 or in the water supply crisis in Cochabamba, Bolivia, in 1999–
2000.95
In fact, however, all of these privatizations of “natural monopolies” have
involved very complex relationships between government and private
entities.96 While private suppliers have sometimes seemed to grasp too much,
it also seems clear that they themselves have sometimes been saddled with
unrealistic burdens and expectations, and that they sometimes have to operate
in a climate of crosscutting political motivations. In Cochabamba, for
example, there were apparently many flaws and mistakes created by the newly
created foreign-dominated private water supply consortium, but it was local
politicians who insisted that the project cover an expensive new dam.97 In part
to cover this expense, the consortium raised consumers’ water rates
dramatically.98 In turn, the rate hikes led to an outburst of popular opposition
and violence that ultimately defeated the entire project and indeed threatened
Bolivian political stability.99
However the blame is allocated in that case, popular fears are very real that
privatization of these enterprises can lead not to the diffusion of power, but
rather to the aggrandizement of monopoly power in private hands, and to the
victimization of ordinary people. This is not to say that all such charges are
true. A 2003 empirical study of privatization in Latin America found that, in
fact, privatized firms generally are more efficient than their state-managed
predecessors, and that they generally offer better services to all social levels.100
94. See, e.g., Michael Hiltzik, Golden State: Davis Recall Effort a Case of Casting Stones,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2003, at C1 (listing energy crisis as first among reasons, though unjustified,
for the recall campaign against then-Governor Grey Davis).
95. Woodhouse, supra note 31; William Finnegan, Leasing the Rain, NEW YORKER, Apr. 8,
2002, at 43.
96. For the range of issues in such enterprises, see Ronald J. Daniels & Michael J.
Trebilcock, Private Provision of Public Infrastructure: An Organizational Analysis of the Next
Privatization Frontier, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 375 (1996).
97. See Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 311–14.
98. Id. at 315–16.
99. Id. at 305–306, 313, 327–28; Finnegan, supra note 95, at 43.
100. FLORENCIO LOPEZ-DE-SILANES & ALBERTO CHONG, YALE INT’L CTR. FOR FIN., THE
TRUTH ABOUT PRIVATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA 4 (2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstsract=464460; cf. Li & Xu, supra note 89, at 426–27 (discussing a study of
telecommunications privatization and concluding that privatization generally enhanced
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This study also found that the failed privatizations are most often attributable
to political interference, to corruption and lack of transparency, and in the case
of “natural monopolies,” to weak governmental capacity to provide the
necessary post-privatization regulatory structure.101
But there is an important political lesson to be learned from these failures.
They show that the full weight of political reform cannot be borne by
privatization alone, contrary to the suggestion of such Enlightenment thinkers
as Steuart. Instead, success or failure, both economic and political, may
depend on the underlying condition of political institutions. Undoubtedly,
privatization often can help to reform politics insofar as newly minted private
sources of income make people less frightened of government, and insofar as
people engaged in trade and commerce are likely to demand access to
information, along with some say in predictably enforced laws. But
privatization itself often depends to a greater or lesser degree on existing
political institutions, and insofar as this is true, politicians still may treat newly
privatized enterprises as a splendid new cash cow. In turn, the “cow” may face
opprobrium for its association with politicians’ pet projects, undermining
confidence in privatization itself. All this suggests that political reform needs
to be approached on broader fronts and in a more direct manner, particularly
by attending to such matters as competent courts and regulatory institutions,
honest elections, and a free press.
C. The Distraction Argument: Private Property and Commerce Can Make
Politics Seem Dull and Boring
The Distraction Argument is a conception that may have influenced some
of the United States’ founders, particularly given their consciousness of the
religious wars that had racked Europe in the previous centuries. The idea
behind the Distraction Argument is that if property can be made secure and
trade made easy, citizens are likely to become more interested in making
money, and correspondingly less interested in killing one another for religious
or clan-related or nationalistic reasons. For these reasons, private property and
active commerce should make politics as a whole less heated and less
deadly.102 Boring politics are better than overheated and over-exciting politics,
according to this view, and the encouragement of commerce is one way to
make politics boring. Thus, low voter turnout may not be taken as a problem,
but rather as a sign that people have better things to do with their time—

performance and competition, but that certain groups, such as previously subsidized pensioners
and laid-off employees, may not have shared in the gains).
101. LOPEZ-DE-SILANES & CHONG, supra note 100, at 4.
102. Martin Diamond, The Federalist, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 631, 648–49
(Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., Rand McNally & Co. 2d ed. 1972).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

PRIVATIZATION—THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY?

711

namely, getting rich.103 If they can busy themselves getting rich, they will stop
shooting at one other. The same idea seems to have animated some members
of George W. Bush’s administration in their hopes for a new Iraq, though the
violence in that country to date has sharply undercut the possibilities for
commerce.104
How do modern ideas about privatization reflect on this political hope for
private property and commerce? The pattern seems to be somewhat mixed. At
least in some of the divestiture cases mentioned above, the privatization of
major utilities has not at all defused politics but rather inflamed them, as in
Bolivia, where the attempted privatization of Cochabamba’s water supply set
off a train of events that united very disparate groups of citizens in violent
opposition to the new supply contract.105 More generally, Amy Chua argues
that globalization, which often overlaps with privatization, can set off ethnic
violence aimed particularly at market-dominant minority groups such as the
Chinese in Indonesia.106 Less violent political fights over the deregulation of
rent control periodically turn up the heat even in New York politics.107
On the other hand, not all deregulations and divestitures have had this
disruptive effect. The privatization of the water systems in some cities in Chile
appears to have worked well without political backlash, perhaps in part
because the Chileans created a system for subsidizing poor families’ water bills
through the social security system.108 This may not accord with the standard
understanding of prices and economic incentives, but it undoubtedly relieved
public opposition. Subsidies are not a complete answer for every situation,
though, because the Cochabamba project aroused fierce opposition even
though it, too, contemplated somewhat lower rates for lower-income
103. See for example Richard A. Posner, Smooth Sailing, LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004, at 41–
42, for Judge Posner’s acid comments on Bruce Ackerman’s and James Fishkin’s idea to have a
“deliberation day” to discuss issues at stake in elections (arguing that competition informs voters
about candidates, just as it does about toasters; that voter apathy can express rational preference;
and that an additional “deliberation day” would take time that citizens would rather spend on
other matters such as family or business).
104. Jay Solomon et al., As Growth Returns to Pakistan, Hopes Rise on Terror Front, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 9, 2004, at A1 (describing the hope that economic improvement would overcome
terrorism).
105. Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 327–28; Andrew Nickson & Claudia Vargas, The Limits
of Water Regulation: The Failure of the Cochabamba Concession in Bolivia, 21 BULL. LATIN
AM. RES. 99, 108–11 (2002).
106. CHUA, supra note 8, at 7.
107. See Guy McPherson, Note, It’s the End of the World As We Know It (and I Feel Fine):
Rent Regulation in New York City and the Unanswered Questions of Market and Society, 72
FORDHAM L. REV., 1125, 1125–26 (2004) (describing political turmoil surrounding New York’s
rent regulation).
108. JAMES WINPENNY, WORLD WATER COUNCIL, FINANCING WATER FOR ALL 19 (2003),
http://www.gwpforum.org/gwp/library/FinPanRep.MainRep.pdf; BARLOW & CLARKE, supra
note 5, at 217.
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households.109 India, which has deregulated many aspects of its economy in
the last few years and has enjoyed a striking economic boom, may be a test
case for the theory that commerce can take the heat out of politics.110
Interestingly enough, the strident and confrontational Hindu nationalist party,
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), was the chief sponsor of India’s deregulation,
and presumably it was destined to become the chief political beneficiary of
economic good fortune.111 Instead, it was the more inclusive Congress Party
and its allies that raised issues about privatization and that surprisingly
defeated the BJP at the polls in 2004, in large part due to the dissatisfaction of
rural citizens who thought that they were left out of the good times.112 All the
same, the Congress Party also seems unlikely to take a major turn away from
its predecessor’s privatization efforts, recognizing their importance for
employment and economic prosperity, so in a sense the book is still out on
whether commerce in India can soften political divisions.113
Modern privatization measures suggest that a key factor for the Distraction
Argument concerns what we might call “baselines.” If a substantial number of
people have a stake in current governmental regulation or management, and if
they think that privatization causes them to suffer a substantial drop in the
current baseline of their well-being (as in the case of tenants who face rent
deregulation), then privatization will heat up politics rather than calm politics
down, at least over a short run. Issues of relative well-being may matter too.
In the 2004 elections, India’s rural poor reacted angrily at seeing themselves
bypassed by the newly wealthy urban sectors, but at least they took out their
resentments in elections.114 Amy Chua recounts much more disastrous
responses to unevenly distributed gains from privatization, particularly when
angry majority populations have ousted and devastated the “market-dominant
minorit[ies]” who had gained the most from free-market policies.115 More
broadly, the issues of baseline and relative status also suggest that
distributional issues may have a very pronounced effect on the possibilities for
privatization.116
109. Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 318–19; Nickson & Vargas, supra note 105, at 111.
110. Amy Waldman, Premier of India Is Forced to Quit After Vote Upset, N.Y. TIMES, May
14, 2004, at A1.
111. Id.
112. Id. (describing Hindu nationalist party rule’s privatization policies and economic
success, and the rural backlash in the election).
113. See Amy Waldman, In India, Economic Growth and Democracy Do Mix, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 2004, at 4-3 (describing continuing central commitment to free market reforms,
including in agriculture, in spite of populist election rhetoric and rural discontent).
114. See Waldman, supra note 110.
115. CHUA, supra note 8, at 163–75.
116. Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 217–20 (1998) (describing potential
political backlash from policies that increase total wealth but also increase distributional gap);
Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1992) (arguing that behavior
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The interplay between distributional issues and economic change is a
subject that has much engaged the economist Gary Libecap, who has studied a
number of proposals to redefine and sharpen property rights. His view, very
crudely stated, is that in contemplating reform, people compare their personal
pre- and post-reform situations; those who had done well under a pre-existing
but inefficient system must often be mollified or paid off, because otherwise
they may be able to mount so much opposition to economic reform that the
reform will never take place.117 Libecap is primarily interested in economic
reform, but his point is basically a political one: that proposed alterations in a
system of entitlements can arouse political disturbances that are so great that
they undermine any economic change. The Cochabama experience is again an
example. The pre-existing water delivery arrangements were fragmented and
grossly inadequate, but water (when and where it was available) was generally
relatively cheap.118 The newly privatizing consortium, by contrast, roused
suspicion among local people—particularly farmers—that they would lose
their existing water sources, however inefficient and ultimately unsustainable
those sources were.119 When the consortium began to raise rates sharply to
cover modernization costs and cover investors’ risks, it only confirmed fears of
pending loss among already mistrustful local groups, uniting the rural and
urban opposition and eventually leading to the riots that brought down the
entire project.120
Such failed modern privatization efforts should deliver a warning about the
old hope that private property can defuse political explosions. The argument
has a certain circularity, and it only works if the shift to private property itself
is politically acceptable—or can be made acceptable through greater
transparency and public discussion, and possibly through distributional
concessions to calm potential opposition. Without these essentially political
moves, privatization may simply inflame politics all the more.
D. The Symbolic Argument: Property Is the Central Right Because It
Symbolizes All Other Rights and Thus Educates All in RightsConsciousness
It is often hard for people to think without real-world examples. Property
has a particular concreteness that makes it especially attractive as an example
of rights generally. This is true in modern scholarship, where torts and
can be motivated strongly by desire for relative status). See generally ROBERT H. FRANK,
CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS (1985).
117. GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 5 (1989).
118. Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 303–05.
119. Id. at 317–21; Nickson & Vargas, supra note 105, at 112.
120. Willem Assies, David Versus Goliath in Cochabamba: Water Rights, Neoliberalism, and
the Revival of Social Protest in Bolivia, LATIN AM. PERSP., May 2003, at 14, 24–30 (2003);
Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 328–37.
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contracts scholars often use examples drawn from property to make their
theoretical points.121 But the use of property examples to illustrate other rights
is a pattern that goes much further back as well. James Madison wrote a
famous public letter describing a whole litany of his rights as property, saying
that he had a “property” in his reputation, his religious views, and in a whole
series of other entitlements.122
Property thus appears to be more available to the imagination than many
other rights, and if this is so, one might think, the protection of property rights
is especially important. Having property rights can make the owner think of
himself or herself as a rights-holding person more generally; if a person owns a
tool or a pig or a house, she gets a sense of what it means to have rights. In
that sense, holding property is an education in what it means to be a rightsbearer.
Now, there are those who disagree with this view, such as Jennifer
Nedelsky, who thinks that property is a poor symbol for other rights.123 And of
course, it is quite hard to measure whether anyone really generalizes from
property ownership to other rights. But there do seem to be some hints that the
symbolic argument has some force, Nedelsky’s contrary view notwithstanding.
Property owners are more likely than tenants to vote and to take part in
community affairs, for example.124 Certainly people with insecure land tenure
seem to be anxious to have more firmly fixed property rights, as is the case
with farmers in China and squatters in urban areas in many less developed
countries.125 Insofar as property rights give people a sense of security, these
rights may act as a kind of emotional platform for greater assertiveness on
other fronts.
Some modern privatization measures could add to this assertiveness,
particularly the “recognition” privatizations that make land tenure more
certain. Privatization in the form of deregulation probably works both for and
against the symbolism of secure rights; on the one hand, deregulation could
add to owners’ sense of security from governmental intrusion, but on the other,
it could diminish the sense of security of, say, tenants who were previously
protected by rent control regulations.

121. See generally Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175 (1997).
122. James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 101–03 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
123. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 262–63 (1990).
124. Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are
Homeowners Better Citizens?, 45 J. URB. AFF. 354, 356 (1999) (stating that homeowners are
fifteen percent more likely to vote in local elections).
125. See, e.g., Craig S. Smith, Chinese Farmers Rebel Against Bureaucracy, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2000, at A1.
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There is one area of modern privatization that seems to cut fairly sharply
against the Symbolic Argument, however: that is, the “enabling” privatization
that protects what are essentially governmentally created property rights,
notably intellectual property (IP). The starting point is that most people are not
holders of significant IP rights.126 Instead, most people perceive themselves as
obligated by IP rights, since the rights belong to others. Many IP rights are
quite counterintuitive. It is a technical violation of copyright, for example, to
sing “Happy Birthday to You” in a bar or restaurant without the copyright
holder’s permission.127 There is even an organization in the United States,
ASCAP, that makes a practice of ferreting out such public performances of
copyrighted songs and demanding payment—as it did from the Girl Scouts a
few years ago, for singing copyrighted songs around the campfire.128 Most
people have no intuition that they are not supposed to perform such
copyrighted material, and they resent being told that they are in violation.129
More seriously, many people feel indignant that because of patent laws, even
the poor have to pay a monopoly price for pharmaceutical drugs, when the
drugs themselves can be manufactured so much more cheaply.130
This is not to say that there are not good economic reasons for enforcing IP
rights, even in the case of pharmaceuticals. There are. Research and
development of drugs is expensive, and aside from direct public subsidy, the
only significant way to recoup that expense is to charge a price higher than the
manufacturing cost for the product itself.131 Without the certainty of this
recompense, much development and improvement of drugs would undoubtedly
dry up, and pharmaceutical companies might increasingly turn away from
medicine to such politically safer products as cosmetics and cures for sexual

126. Or, if they are technically holders of IP rights, they don’t know it. For example, many
people are technically owners of copyrights on writings or artwork, since copyright attaches as
soon as one “fixes” the writing or work of art, and thus one has a copyright in one’s doodles on a
page. But most people are unaware of these rights.
127. See, e.g., Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 951, 964–65 (2004) (describing everyday activities that infringe copyright).
128. See Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of
Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 56 (2004) (describing Girl Scout episode as
example of popular backlash when content holders overplay their hand).
129. See id.; see also JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 29 (2001) (noting
counterintuitive character of some copyright rules).
130. M. Gregg Bloche & Elizabeth R. Jungman, Health Policy and the WTO, 31 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 529, 535 (2003) (describing criticism of patent law for withholding cheaply manufactured
drugs from poor nations and persons).
131. Theodore C. Bailey, Note, Innovation and Access: The Role of Compulsory Licensing in
the Development and Distribution of HIV/AIDS Drugs, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 193,
202–04 (describing high risks of drug research and development and the need for patent
protection for incentive).
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dysfunctions.132 But however compelling those economic arguments may be,
as a matter of political symbolism, enforcement of IP rights seems not an
education in rights-bearing, but rather an education in having to bear the
burden of other people’s rights. If anything, for most people, the symbolism of
IP is disempowering: the symbolism of this form of property is all too often
that the powerful have rights, while the rest of us have only obligations.
Indeed, this disempowering symbolism maps onto larger global tensions: the
nations most insistent on IP enforcement are the IP-exporting developed
countries, whereas less-developed countries have tended to resist.
The dictatorial edges of IP can be softened. One method is much like the
method that Chile used to soften the edges when privatizing some urban water
systems—that is, by establishing a subsidy for poor families, which in effect
acts like a two-tier pricing system.133 The controversies over delivering AIDS
drugs to less-developed countries have generated a great deal of thinking about
tiered systems of payment and about other ways that IP rights and charges
might be modified to accommodate overwhelming need.134 A second method
to soften the edges speaks to a quite different concern, namely to make IP law
more attentive to the intellectual creativity of non-Western societies. There are
many galling stories about Western firms that patent minor variations on
plants—plants that non-Western cultivators actually developed over long time
periods—and there are other similar stories about Western firms that record
folktales and then claim copyright, even against the communities from which
these tales arose.135 In more recent negotiations on international IP, lessdeveloped countries have been able to get some national protection for local
knowledge and cultural productions, for example, for folklore.136 There are
certain difficulties with this solution, however, since in some countries,
traditional communities have substantial conflicts with their own national
governments, so that local communities may not be so happy with national IP

132. See, e.g., James Surowiecki, No Profit, No Cure, NEW YORKER, Nov. 5, 2001, at 46
(suggesting that if patent protection on medicines is weakened, drug companies will divert
research efforts to baldness or impotence cures).
133. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
134. See Jean O. Lanjouw, Intellectual Property and the Availability of Pharmaceuticals in
Poor Countries, 3 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 91, 109, 112–14 (2002) (developing the theme of
tiered pricing); see also Bailey, supra note 131, at 217–18 (comparing differential pricing to
compulsory licensing).
135. See, e.g., Thomas Cottier & Marion Panizzon, Legal Perspectives on Traditional
Knowledge: The Case for Intellectual Property Protection, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 371, 373–74
(2004) (describing instances of much-resented “biopiracy”); cf. MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS
NATIVE CULTURE? 132–34 (2003) (arguing that claims may be ambiguous in connection with
technologically advanced uses of native plants).
136. Cottier & Panizzon, supra note 135, at 376–81 (describing new international and
national legislation to protect traditional knowledge).
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ownership of local creativity.137 More broadly, special protections for
traditional knowledge subtly undermine the chief theoretical justification for
any kind of IP, namely the claim that IP incentivizes intellectual creativity.
Traditional knowledge has already been “out there” for some time, and this
kind of knowledge would seem to need no further incentive for production.138
On the other hand, understood as a claim of compensation for contribution,
some stretching and bending of standard IP categories could mean that in the
future, IP protections will not so lopsidedly symbolize the power of more
developed countries against less developed ones.139
The debate over traditional knowledge is a kind of marker of IP’s symbolic
significance more broadly—one striking instance among many in a larger
pattern. However economically useful it may be, IP is a highly specialized
kind of property. Precisely because its beneficiaries constitute a relatively
narrow set of claimants, IP’s symbolism for most people contradicts the idea
that property acts as an education in rights-bearing. Instead, for most, IP is
simply not personalized or widespread enough to count as a symbol of rightsbearing. Moreover, unlike the ownership of consumer goods or even land, it is
unlikely that IP ever will be very personalized or widespread, because IP is an
unlikely candidate for broad ownership. It is not hard to imagine even very
poor people owning some small space, some tools or domestic animals or
personal items; but it is hard to imagine those people holding any meaningful
rights under IP. All IP will teach such people is that some have rights, while
most do not.
With respect to property’s symbolic significance, then, modern
privatization again presents a mixed picture: some aspects of privatization
seem to support property’s symbolism of rights, insofar as privatization helps
many people to claim ownership. But some other aspects of privatization,
notably an expanded IP, serve notice that not all property can function well as
a symbol of what it means to bear rights.

137. See generally BROWN, supra note 135.
138. Shubha Ghosh, Traditional Knowledge, Patents, and the New Mercantilism (Part I), 85
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 828, 829–30 (2003); see also Anupam Chander & Madhavi
Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1354–55 (2004) (noting
awkwardness of traditional knowledge protections in standard IP theory).
139. Ghosh, supra note 138, at 832–33 (describing traditional knowledge debates as
distributional matter between more developed and less developed nations); Chander & Sunder,
supra note 138, at 1354–57, 1363–69 (same; also relating the traditional knowledge debate to
treaty-related alteration in the scope of the prior “commons” in intellectual productions); see also
Jim Chen, Biodiversity and Biotechnology: A Misunderstood Relation, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV.
51, 54, 75–76 (2005) (same). However, although sympathetic to compensation claims in other
forms, Chen rejects the propertization of traditional knowledge either by traditional communities
or first-world developers, because in his view this would diminish the beneficial spread of
knowledge. Id. at 78, 83–84.
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The Civilizing Argument: Property and Commerce Are Central Rights
Because They Educate People in the Patterns of Give-and-Take on Which
Democracy Depends

The Civilizing Argument also goes back to the classical eighteenth-century
thinkers on political economy. But it rings rather strangely in modern ears,
accustomed as we are to the Marxist description of the ferocity of capitalist
exploitation.140 Earlier thinkers like Montesquieu and Hume, however,
compared commercial practice favorably to the even more ferocious practices
of aristocratic society, and they argued that commerce “softens” manners.141
The intuition here is that commercial people cannot afford the pomposity,
vainglory, and casual violence of aristocrats. Nor, in a more modern setting,
can they afford the rudeness that so plagued customer relations in some
socialist states. Merchants have to pay attention to the wants and interests of
others because they have to bargain with others to arrive at a mutually
satisfactory conclusion. This is as true of modern commerce as it was in
earlier times; like it or not, Disney and McDonald’s are exquisitely sensitive to
the demands of their customers.142 They have to be, or their customers will go
elsewhere.
One sees this pattern of attentiveness quite markedly in some of the
privatizing activity of recent years. For example, when McDonald’s opened its
first Moscow restaurant, it had to teach its employees to smile at customers,
something that caused astonishment among the customers themselves.143
Similarly, as China began a few years ago to open up some enterprises to a
freer commerce, the government had to give elaborate instructions to store
clerks on some things that they should not say to customers, e.g., “Stop
shouting. Can’t you see I’m eating?”144
There is another socializing factor at work in commercial relations as well.
Much commerce consists of repeat dealings, so that, in their business affairs,
people try to get to know one another and try to earn the trust of others as
potential trading partners. Though the matter is controversial, some historians
even attribute the rise of philanthropy in the early nineteenth century to the
expansion of world trade, as merchants learned about very distant peoples and
140. See Keystone Right, supra note 11, at 351–52.
141. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS 54–62 (1977).
142. See Rod Newing, Broader View Wins More Plaudits, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2005, at 5
(calling Disney the fifth strongest company in the world in customer service); Sherri Day &
Stuart Elliott, At McDonald’s, An Effort to Restore Lost Luster, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2003, at C1.
143. Francis X. Cline, Upheaval in the East; Moscow McDonald’s Opens, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
1, 1990, at A13 (describing training in first Moscow McDonald’s). See generally Adi Ignatius,
Russians Who Wear Jungle Ties or Spit Need Not Apply, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1992, at A1.
144. Seth Faison, Service with Some Bile, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1995, at 4-4. Among the
other banned remarks of clerks to customers were “Didn’t you hear me? What do you have ears
for?” and “Why didn’t you choose well when you bought it?” Id.
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became interested in their well-being.145 These patterns continue; sometimes
commercial relationships can develop into genuine friendships, friendships that
would have been inconceivable except through the gateway of initial
commercial contacts.
There are undoubtedly untold instances of rudeness, deceit, and selfdealing in commercial relationships, but we think of these examples over
against a backdrop of more typical commercial behavior, which on the whole
is reasonably polite and respectful of the rights of others. We tend to forget
that this “normal” behavior is part of a culture of commerce, and we think it is
simply nature. But it is not. It is learned behavior, and commerce helps to
teach it.
At the same time, there are cautionary areas in modern privatization. Once
again, the divestiture of public utilities is a particularly problematic area for
any “civilizing” character of privatization. It is not that privatized utilities’
staffs are more rude and autocratic than state-run ones; but they may not be a
great deal better. This comes from the “natural monopoly” character of
utilities, which means that they are relatively undisciplined by competition—
the very force that drives commercial people to be attentive to customers.146
Even in more developed countries, there are many complaints of rudeness and
unresponsiveness from the gas company, the electric company, or the local
telephone company. They do not have to compete for your business, and as a
consequence, they may not pay a great deal of attention to your wishes or
complaints.
All this is relative, though, and perhaps even the “natural monopolies”—
and even bureaucrats—can learn a modicum of politeness if they are
surrounded by other more conventional commercial activities. Democracies
require some of the same cultural traits that property and commerce do: respect
for the rights of others, an appeal to voluntary agreement rather than force, the
channeling of self-interest into cooperation for mutual benefit. Indeed, when
we think about it, there are rather few circumstances in which we regularly
take into account the needs of others and try to cooperate with them and to earn
their trust. Those that exist are very intense, of course: friendship, family, and
love also do this work. But friendship, family and love do not carry us very far
from home. Property and trade, on the other hand, can carry us very far
indeed, connecting people to others who are strangers to them; consider, for
example, the numbers of persons whom you must trust to take a trip in an
airplane. And although the appeal to cooperation in commerce has a thin
emotional basis—what used to be called “self-interest rightly understood”—
commerce still generates institutions in which we learn to engage peacefully
with very distant others, and we learn that we can do well for ourselves by
145. Keystone Right, supra note 11, at 353–54 (describing thesis and controversies about it).
146. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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respecting rights, avoiding violence, and behaving in trustworthy ways. If
there is any really important political capital to be gained for democracies from
privatization, surely this culture of commerce must be part of it.
V. CONCLUSION
In all the examples given above, modern privatization efforts suggest a
mixed picture, a certain muting of the political arguments for property and free
commerce. It is not that the old arguments are flatly or even mostly wrong, but
rather that in some arenas, modern privatization efforts illustrate some weak
spots in the older political arguments for property. In fact, many of the modern
efforts to privatize are themselves state-led, and it would be surprising indeed
if privatization could turn around and single-handedly reform the political
culture of the very states that initiated privatization.
The take-away lesson is that privatization in a modern context is only one
of a whole array of political reforms, though it is an important one.
Privatization, for example, can help to increase the demand for governmental
accountability and competence, but this is in part because private property
depends on accountable and competent government. There is certain
circularity here: property requires that a modicum of governmental competence
already be in place before property-owners can increase the demand for more
competence. That is why democratic reform needs to engage in efforts on
many different fronts, not just the economic one.

